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ETHNICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS 
FELIX B. CHANG* 
Races often collide in segmented markets where buyers 
belong to one ethnic group while sellers belong to another. This 
Article examines one such market: the retail of wigs and hair 
extensions for African Americans, a multi-billion-dollar market 
controlled by Korean Americans. Although previous scholarship 
attributed the success of Korean American ventures to rotating 
credit and social capital, this Article ascribes their dominance in 
wigs and extensions to collusion and exclusion, tactics scrutinized 
under antitrust. 
This Article is the first to synthesize the disparate treatment 
of ethnically segmented markets in law, sociology, and economics 
into a comprehensive framework. Its primary contribution is to 
forge the concept of ethnically segmented and misaligned 
(“ESM”) markets, where buyers and sellers are ethnically distinct 
from one another. 
ESM markets challenge entrenched paradigms in antitrust. In 
the wigs and extensions market, the endurance of Korean 
American retailers confounds conventional notions of market 
power, which is measured at the firm level. This market suggests 
that numerous in-group incumbents can compete intensely with 
one another but collaborate to stymie out-group insurgents. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Segmented markets are the product of markets dividing to 
serve groups with similar supply or demand preferences.1 In 
ethnically segmented markets, that division occurs due to ethnic 
or racial preferences. For instance, an all-white homeowners’ 
association might exclude African Americans from a 
neighborhood to inflate home values, thereby segmenting its 
housing stock.2 More innocuously, grocery stores in a diverse city 
might track the segmented food preferences of its ethnic 
residents.3  
The most puzzling—and disconcerting—ethnically 
segmented markets, however, are ones where consumers hail 
from one ethnic or racial group while sellers hail from another. 
Such markets present a conundrum: why are buyers and sellers 
ethnically distinct? 
The piecemeal literature on ethnically segmented markets 
does not provide a satisfactory answer. In economics, the debate 
 
1 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING 
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 196-200 (1980). 
2 See Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45 (2010). Similarly, 
labor markets might be segment along the lines of occupation, geography, race, 
education, and immigration status. See Michael Reich et al., Dual Labor Markets: 
A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 359 (1973); William T. 
Dickens & Kevin Lang, Labor Market Segmentation Theory: Reconsidering the 
Evidence, in LABOR ECONOMICS: PROBLEMS IN ANALYZING LABOR MARKETS 
(William Darity, Jr. ed., 1993). 
3 See Ogenyi E. Omar et al., Food Shopping Behavior Among Ethnic and Non-Ethnic 
Communities in Britain, 10 J. FOOD PRODUCTS MARKETING 39 (2004). Some 
markets, such as ethnic foods, are more susceptible to consumer crossover than 
others, such as ethnic beauty products. With ethnic foods, debates of purity 
versus fusion replicate the economic discourse on market segmentation and 
integration while upping the cultural ante. See, e.g., Roxana Hadadi, Alison 
Roman, the Colonization of Spices, and the Exhausting Prevalence of Ethnic Erasure 
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has revolved around whether racial preferences are inefficient 
and, by extension, whether ethnically segmented markets should 
yield to market integration over time.4  Neither side convincingly 
explains why some ethnically segmented markets thrive as a 
misalignment of ethnically distinct buyers and sellers.5 After all, 
ethnically homogenous consumers should prefer to buy from co-
ethnic producers.6 
Legal scholars tend to examine ethnically segmented markets 
from the side of producers rather than consumers. Borrowing 
from antitrust theory, race and law scholars have framed the 
exclusion of peoples of color from housing and labor markets as a 
mechanism of racial cartels.7 In law and development circles, one 
camp of scholars has emphasized structural explanations for the 
dominance of ethnic groups in niche markets, typically against the 
backdrop of exclusion of all peoples of color from mainstream 
economies.8 By contrast, another other camp has fixated on the 
institutions, relationships, and private ordering peculiar to ethnic 
communities.9 In totality, however, legal scholars have not 
 
4 See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). 
5 See Amanda Lea Robinson, Internal Borders: Ethnic-Based Market Segmentation 
in Malawi, 87 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 371 (2016). 
6 In fact, silos of co-ethnic buyers and sellers mark societies that are 
characterized by high degrees of interethnic tension and economic 
fragmentation. See id. 
7 See Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 51 (defining racial cartels as “groups in which 
members agree to artificially fix wages, property values, political power and 
other price-like analogues, by restricting supply, dividing up markets, or 
colluding to achieve other commercial conditions). 
8 See, e.g., Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres 
and a Mule”: A Theory of Black Weest Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 27 (2014) (examining structural factors giving entrepreneurs from the 
West Indies a leg up, in comparison with other Black Americans).  
9 See, e.g., Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
841 (1999) (examining rotating credit associations in immigrant communities) 
[hereinafter Cao, Communities and Markets]; Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, 
and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 
(1998) (correlating the success of some “market-dominant  minorities” with 
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articulated a comprehensive theory of markets that are both 
ethnically segmented and ethnically misaligned. 
Sociology presents the most exhaustive treatment of these 
markets, though it, too, falls short in explaining the persistence of 
ethnic misalignment. Here the seminal work revolved around 
middleman minorities—sojourners such as Chinese, Jewish, 
Indian, and Lebanese merchants who mediate between majority 
and other minority groups.10 Over time, this framework morphed 
into  ethnic entrepreneurs to cover non-itinerant groups.11 
Nonetheless, it continued to miss the business tactics that enable 
in-group sellers to maintain dominance over out-group 
competitors.12 
To unify the disparate approaches across law, economics, and 
sociology, this Article articulates a theory for the endurance of 
ethnically segmented markets where producers hail from one 
ethnicity while consumers hail from another—a concept this 
Article calls ethnically segmented and misaligned (“ESM”) 
 
their cultural dispositions); BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE 
DIAMOND NETWORK AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE (2017) 
[hereinafter RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE] (linking the success of certain 
ethnicities in the diamond industry with intraethnic exchanges and 
relationships); Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: 
Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1599 (2000) (tracing the development of Chinese corporate law to traditions of 
family and kinship).  
10 See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 
(1967); Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. SOC. REV. 583 
(1973). See also FELIX CHANG & SUNNIE RUCKER-CHANG (EDS.), CHINESE 
MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA AND EUROPE (2010); KHUN-ENG KUAH & 
EVELYN HU DEHART (EDS.), VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CHINESE 
DIASPORA (2006). 
11 See IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN 
LOS ANGELES 1965–1982, 17 (1988) [hereinafter LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT 
ENTREPRENEURS]; See also Zulema Valdez, Beyond Ethnic Entrepreneurship: An 
Embedded Market Approach to Group Affiliation in American Enterprise, 15 RACE, 
GENDER & CLASS 156 (2008).  
12 But see In-JIN YOON, ON MY OWN: KOREAN BUSINESSES AND RACE RELATIONS 
IN AMERICA (1997); In-Jin Yoon, The Growth of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship 
in Chicago, 18 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 315 (1995). 
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markets. As its first step, the Article proffers a definition of 
ethnically segmented markets that encompasses all three 
disciplines. The Article’s central contribution is to bring clarity to 
this concept, which has spanned multiple fields with no coherent 
framework. 
Focusing on the retail of wigs and hair extensions to African 
Americans, which is dominated by Korean American firms, this 
Article illuminates that most peculiar of segmented markets—
where buyers and sellers are ethnically homogenous but 
misaligned. The size of the market for hair and extensions is 
estimated at $6 billion.13 It is delineated along racial lines, with 
African American women comprising the largest segment. Due to 
a confluence of societal pressures and beauty standards, African 
American women are also steadfast consumers,14 so demand in 
the market is inelastic, which tends to support market power 
among producers.15 
This Article argues that Korean American sellers (the 
market’s main producers) maintain dominance not through 
structural or cultural advantages, but by collusion and exclusion. 
In mainstream economies, these strategies are employed by so 
many dominant firms that they have become the staple of 
antitrust cases.16 In ESM markets, however, coordination and 
exclusion assume a sociological dimension, with anticompetitive 
 
13 Susan Adams, Long on Hair: The World’s First Venture-Backed Human-Hair-
Extension Company Wants To Be The Airbnb of Salons, FORBES, Sept. 27, 2019. 
14 See infra Section III.A. 
15 See infra Section IV.A.1. 
16 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (parallel insertion 
of price maintenance clause into exhibition contracts by film distributors led to 
inference of collusion); American Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377 
(1921) (information exchange among hardwood manufacturers facilitated by 
trade association found to constitute price fixing); U.S. v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 
(4th Cir. 1979) (communication among otherwise competing realtors facilitated 
their conspiracy to raise commission rates). 
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effects reinforced by co-ethnic bonds.17 During the 1970s, it was a 
combination of economic forces, racial structures, and shifting 
beauty standards that initially propelled Korean-owned firms to 
power.18 This Article focuses on how Korean American retailers 
leveraged and maintained that power in the face of challenges by 
African American competitors. In these markets, retailers 
managed to band together intraethnically and fend off 
competition interracially, through tactics that can be 
conceptualized as antitrust offenses. 
Antitrust is an apt springboard for analysis because African 
Americans often frame their relationship with Korean American 
retailers in anticompetitive terms. It is often asserted that Korean 
American firms exert a “monopoly” over, and have 
“monopolized,” the Black beauty supply stores.19 Yet monopoly 
and monopolization have specific meanings that demand careful 
market power analysis.20 Working through the requisite steps 
infuses the literature on these buyer–seller interactions (and, 
accordingly, interethnic interactions) with rigor. Further, the 
interactions between African American buyers and Korean 
American sellers occur wholly outside the ambit of the state and 
therefore out of the purview of public law. That race relations 
 
17 This is not entirely straightforward. While Korean Americans can appeal to 
ethnic solidarity and utilize publications and associates to facilitate information 
exchange, intraethnic competition is intense. See LIGHT & BONACICH, 
IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 193–93. 
18 See Jason Petrulis, “A Country of Hair”: A Global Story of South Korean Wigs, 
Korean American Entrepreneurs, African American Hairstyles, and Cold War 
Industrialization, 21 ENTERPRISE & SOC. 1 (2020); Ku-Sup Chin et al., Immigrant 
Small Business and International Economic Linkage: A Case of the Korean Wig 
Business in Los Angeles, 1968-1977, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 485 (1996). This 
history has entered popular imagination as well. See NICOLA YOON, THE SUN IS 
ALSO A STAR (2016). 
19 See Edward Tony Lloneau, How and Why Korean Owned Beauty Supply Stores 
Dominate in the Afro Community, LIQUID GOLD BLOG (2013) [archived at 
https://perma.cc/9D5U-BPNF]. 
20 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 92 (4th ed. 2011). 
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often unfold as private transactions under private law is well-
understood.21 Arguably, where transactions between races can be 
characterized as buyer–seller transactions, as in ESM markets, 
laws governing commerce are more appropriate than 
antidiscrimination laws as a point of entry. 
Insights about ethnically segmented markets can push the 
boundaries of antitrust as well. The endurance of Korean 
American firms suggests that collusive and exclusionary schemes 
may be more stable than antitrust theory holds. Further, this 
market suggests that measuring market power at the firm level 
may not always be appropriate. While the literature on cartels has 
centered on a small number of large producers,22 coordination 
among a multitude of small firms in ESM markets is possible.23 
This coheres with the axiom from sociology that an ethnic group 
withdraws into itself, strengthening co-ethnic bonds, when 
threatened by exogenous forces.24 This Article’s second major 
contribution is therefore the discovery that in-group producers 
can coordinate against and exclude out-group competitors by 
utilizing ethnic bonds. 
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Section II 
synthesizes the treatment of ethnically segmented markets in law, 
 
21 Debate over the scope of public law to cover private actions stretches as far 
back as the Reconstruction Amendments. See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, WEST 
FROM APPOMATTOX: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
204–05 (2007); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2008) More recent discourse on the 
relevance of private law to interethnic relations includes Cao, Communities and 
Markets, supra note 9; RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE, supra note 9. 
22 The classic study is Reinhard Selten, A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, 
Where 4 Are Few and 6 Are Many, 2 INT’L J. GAME TH. 141 (1973). See also Margaret 
C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. 
LIT. 43 (2006); Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contrcts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 
241 (1996). 
23 National Society of Professional Engineers; BMI  
24 Beleagurered merchants likely to withdraw into “distinctive cultural and 
organizational forms,” thereby resisting integration. J.H. Turner & Edna 
Bonacich, Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities, 7 ETHNICITY 144, 
154 (1980). 
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economics, and sociology to provide an edifice for the concept. 
Section III introduces the market for wigs and hair extensions as 
a template for ESM markets. Section IV works through the market 
power and facilitating practices of Korean American retailers. In 
doing so, it considers how this market pushes the boundaries of 
antitrust doctrine.  
Before this Article proceeds further, an explanation of 
terminology is in order. First, this Article refers to “ethnically” 
segmented markets rather than “racially” segmented markets 
even though the latter could suffice for the retail of wigs and hair 
extensions to African Americans. African Americans, of course, 
are a racialized group,25 while Korean Americans are an ethnicity 
within the Asian American racial group.26 Their misalignment in 
this market is both ethnic and racial. Nevertheless, the Article 
adopts “ethnic” for consistency with the sociological literature, 
which refers to ethnic entrepreneurs.27 This also attains a greater 
degree of precision regarding the producers (i.e., Korean 
Americans), rather than subsuming them in a larger racial 
category (i.e., Asian Americans, whose diverse constituents 
exhibit differing rates of entrepreneurship). This specificity is 
consistent with the antitrust notion that markets must be defined 
as narrowly as possible to accurately capture market power.28 
  
 
25 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
(3rd ed., 2014). Recent scholarship, however, has come to view race as a power 
construct, rather than social construct. See, e.g., [prior work redacted for 
anonymity]. 
26 For a thorough literature review of ethnicity, especially in the context of 
Asian Americans, see YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY: 
BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITIES 1–10 (1992). 
27 See infra Section II.B. 
28 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 92 (“A relevant market is the smallest 
grouping of sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently 
low that  a ‘hypothetical monopolist’ . . . could profitably reduce output and 
increase price . . .”). 
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II.  DEFINING ETHNICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS 
 
Existing treatment of ethnically segmented markets is, for 
lack of a better word, segmented along disciplines. Law, 
economics, and sociology have all tackled ethnically segmented 
markets, but through their narrow disciplinary confines. This 
Section assembles a definition of ethnically segmented markets 
from the disparate but complementary scholarship, with a view 
toward illuminating the markets at the crux of this Article. 
Ultimately, this Section arrives at the following definition of 
ethnically segmented and misaligned markets: buyers are 
ethnically homogenous and exhibit similar demand preferences 
but are served by producers who are themselves ethnically 
homogenous but also ethnically distinct from buyers. 
 
A.  Contributions from Law 
1.  Market division 
 
Law’s primary contribution to ethnically segmented markets 
is the insight from antitrust that markets divide. They divide 
naturally, as a result of consumer preferences, and artificially, as 
a result of coordination to boost and maintain market power. 
These divisions form the basis for market segmentation along the 
demarcations of ethnicity. Other legal concepts, such as racial 
cartels and the interplay between markets and ethnicity, build 
upon this intuition of segmentation. 
Every market can be broken down into a product market and 
a geographic market.29 A product market might segment along 
price points, while a geographic market might splinter to reflect 
logistical challenges. For instance, the vast market for hotels is 
indisputably segmented along high-end and budget options, with 
a large and amorphous segment in the middle. In New York City, 
the Ritz Carlton or Waldorf Astoria might be interchangeable 
 
29 Id. at §§ 3.3, 3.6.  
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with each other but not with budget motels.30 New York City may 
not even comprise one geographic market. Arguably, high-end 
hotels in Staten Island are not interchangeable with high-end 
hotels in Midtown Manhattan.31 
With ethnically segmented markets, product markets are 
divided along ethnic lines. In a metropolis as large and diverse as 
Los Angeles, it would be foolhardy to define the grocery store 
market as all grocery stores in Los Angeles County. The product 
market is segmented along ethnic lines, catering to the tastes and 
preferences of the city’s multitude of residents.32 This holds for 
even smaller slivers of the County. Thus, all grocery stores in the 
Mid-Wilshire area of Los Angeles cannot be lumped into one 
product market; given the area’s diversity, grocery stores catering 
mostly to Chicano patrons might not be interchangeable with 
stores catering mostly  to Ethiopian or Korean patrons. Further, 
considering the snarl of Los Angeles traffic, geographic markets 
should be drawn more compactly than in other cities. Thus, even 
if Asian grocery stores comprise a single product market, we 
might aptly define Asian grocery stores in Monterey Park and 
West Covina as separate geographic markets, even though both 
are located in the San Gabriel Valley.33 The 10 miles that separate 
 
30 The two extremes are not interchangeable, meaning customers at either end 
are unlikely to cross over into the other segment. This is the hallmark of 
delineating a market, with boundaries drawn only around products that are 
not interchangeable or substitutable. 
31 Business and luxury travelers to Midtown Manhattan may be inclined to stay 
close to the center of financial activity or tourist attractions.  
32 As an illustration of the aptness of the “ethnic” segmentation label, saying 
that grocery stores in Los Angeles are segmented along racial lines might even 
be too imprecise. The many ethnicities racialized as Hispanic, for instance, may 
diverge in culinary preferences. See Vanessa Fonseca, Nuevo Latino: Rebranding 
Latin American Cuisine, 8 CONSUMPTION, MARKETS AND CULTURE 95, 100–01 
(2005). 
33 On the demographic fluctuations of Monterey Park, see Keith Aoki, Direct 
Democracy, Racial Group Agency, Local Government law, and Residential Racial 
Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 
185 (1997). 
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these two neighborhoods might be prohibitively far for a 
customer to drive to save, say, 10%, on the cost of groceries.34 
2.  Racial cartelization and exclusion 
 
Notably, market segmentation—including ethnic 
segmentation—can arise from more heavy-handed forces than 
product preferences or ease of transportation. Producers, rather 
than consumers, might divide markets to maintain  market 
power—i.e., their ability to increase profits by reducing output 
and charging supracompetitive prices.35 Famously, a bar review 
course provider ceded the Georgia market to another provider in 
exchange for a covenant not to compete outside the state; thus, 
each monopolized a portion of the national market.36 In 
heterogenous product markets, firms might specialize in specific 
products so as to minimize overlap and attain market power.37 
This nefarious strain of market segmentation informs what 
race and law scholars have coined as “racial cartels.”38 Just as 
several producers with small market shares can band together to 
divide a market among themselves, all-white associations can 
cartelize a market to raise economic, social, and racial status.39 
Coordination foments power. More concretely, white unions 
went on strike to prevent employers from hiring Black and 
Chinese workers, thereby restricting the pool of available labor 
and boosting earning within that pool.40 White homeowners’ 
associations persuaded homeowners to adopt racially restrictive 
 
34 For a discussion of the 10% figure, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 95–96. 
35 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).See 
also Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in 
Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987). 
36 Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
37 Kenneth M. Davidson, The Competitive Significance of Segmented Markets, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1983). 
38 See Roithmayr, supra note 2. 
39 See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK 
IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014). 
40 [hafez] 
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covenants that prevented home sales to African Americans, Asian 
Americans, and Latinos, thereby ensuring White ownership of 
homes and boosting home values.41 The Democratic Party purged 
Black members between the 1880s and the 1950s to lock-up 
political power.42 In each instance, Whites segmented the 
markets—for labor, for homes, and for political representation—
along racial lines and inflated pricing and power through 
strategies of cartelization and exclusion. 
From racial cartels, we discover that even small and discrete 
numbers can band together to concoct and execute exclusionary 
schemes. As we shall see, this pushes against the antitrust notion 
that cartels fare best when members are few and large and 
markets are concentrated.43 We can also begin to understand how 
some markets remain ethnically misaligned: through the hard 
work of cultivating oligopolies and exclusion. 
3.  Interplay between ethnicities and markets 
 
Legal scholars have posited alternating theories for why 
certain markets are dominated by ethnically homogenous 
producers. One fixture among law and development scholars is 
Amy Chua, whose inquiries into “market-dominant ethnic 
minorities” began in the 1990s, soon after the Los Angeles riots 
and the fall of the Soviet Union.44 Professor Chua noted the 
similarities binding these minorities worldwide, who tend to 
 
41 See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in Post-Civil Rights 
America: Stalled Integration or End of the Segregated Century?, 11 DU BOIS REV.: 
SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 205 (2014); HARRIET B. NEUBURGER ET AL. NEIGHBORHOOD 
AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN MODERN AMERICA (2011); 
Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 52–53. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
42 Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 65–70. 
43 See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & 
ECON. 365 (1970); George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price-
Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 13 (1974); HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 
159. 
44 See Chua, supra note 9; AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE 
MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2004). 
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transact with “impoverished” and “disadvantaged” 
“indigenous” majorities.45 She conjectured that economic and 
political liberalization fueled interethnic conflicts by 
strengthening the hand of the market-dominant minorities.46 
While some of Professor Chua’s subsequent writings provoked 
controversy,47 her work in this area remains influential.  
Other scholars have examined the traits and communal 
practices within certain ethnic groups that fuel high rates of 
entrepreneurship. Here studies of the kye, or rotating credit 
systems in the Korean community, are emblematic.48 In rotating 
credit systems, members contribute money on a regular basis into 
a communal pot and take turns withdrawing from the pot.49 For 
law scholars, rotating credit signifies a broader pattern of informal 
arrangements held together by trust, ethnic solidarity, and 
decentralized information exchange—features endogenous to, 
and built up within, ethnic communities.50 To be sure, these 
 
45 CHUA, supra note 41, at 6 and 7. Professor Chua’s work has limited 
applicability to ethnically segmented and misaligned markets. In the U.S., 
buyers and sellers in these markets tend to be minority groups themselves; the 
dynamics are different and altogether fluid. 
46 Id. at 7. On the use of competition law as a corrective to the influence of 
market-dominant minorities, see Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and 
Competition Law: Lessons From and For South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 579 (2000). 
47 Professor Chua subsequent books include AMY CHUA & JED RUBENFELD, THE 
TRIPLE PACKAGE: HOW THREE UNLIKELY TRAITS EXPLAIN THE RISE AND FALL OF 
CULTURAL GROUPS IN AMERICA (2014), which would be criticized for suggesting 
that some minority groups are innately dominant and interethnic tension is 
inherent. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee & Min Zhou, From Unassimilable to Exceptional: 
The Rise of Asian Americans and “Stereotype Promise”, 16 NEW DIVERSITIES 7 
(2014). 
48 Other examples include the Chinese and Vietnamese “hui,” the Japanese 
“tanamoshi,” the Cambodian “thong thing,” the Mexican “cundina,” the 
Ethiopian “ekub,” and West Indian “esusu.” Cao, Communities and Markets, 
supra note 9, at 848. 
49 These informal arrangements are often the primary source of funding for 
starting businesses. 
50 See id. See also Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521 (2003). 
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scholars are cognizant of structural factors. Lan Cao, for instance, 
devotes plenty of discussion to why certain groups (e.g., Koreans, 
Chinese, and Mexicans) can amass capital while other cannot 
(e.g., African Americans).51 Hence, this literature might be 
characterized bottom-up studies of the endogenous and 
sociocultural factors that contribute to ethnic entrepreneurship.52 
In a similar vein, Barak Richman has written on the control 
over the diamond industry exerted by ethnic groups who rely on 
private systems of contract enforcement.53 Jewish merchants in 
New York, for instance, owe their success to intraethnic 
institutions that enforce executory contracts and enable payment 
for diamonds on credit.54 Like the kye, these institutions function 
outside the auspices of any government, so Professor Richman 
calls them “stateless commerce.”55  
Ethnic trading networks are also stateless in the sense that they 
cross national boundaries. The diamond trade is a transnational 
business controlled at certain junctures by specific ethnic groups, 
particularly Jewish merchants—just as wigs and hair extensions 
for African Americans are manufactured, distributed, and sold in 
a transnational chain where Koreans and Korean Americans 
predominate. Where the wigs and hair extensions market departs 
from the case studies of Professors Cao and Richman, however, is 
in its ethnic misalignment between producers and consumers. For 
the diamond markets to resemble this ESM market, customers 
would have to be ethnically homogenous peoples of color who are 
ethnically distinct from the merchants. Moreover, diamonds 
 
51 See Cao, supra note 9, at 879. 
52 Id. at 863. 
53 See Barak D. Richman, Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and 
Development Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol 
et al. eds., 2013); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic 
Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383 
(2006) [hereinafter Richman, Community Institutions]; RICHMAN, STATELESS 
COMMERCE supra note 9. 
54 Richman, Community Institutions, supra note 50, at 389. 
55 RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE supra note 9, at xi. 
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would have to be indispensable to conformity with mainstream 
aesthetic standards,56 and co-ethnic sellers would have to be 
virtually nonexistent.57 Thus, while the bottom-up endogenous 
scholarship directs our attention to the institutional factors of 
Korean success (and those institutions certainly exist), ethnic 
misalignment of the wigs and hair extensions market requires that 
we consider two groups: purchasers and consumers. 
At the other end of law and development scholarship are 
academics who look exclusively at structural explanations for the 
success of specific ethnic groups.58 Eleanor Brown, for example, 
positions her work on property rights as a complement to cultural 
approaches toward West Indians immigrants and their 
descendants, who exhibit much higher rates of entrepreneurship 
than other racialized Black Americans.59 Professor Brown relates 
the success of Black West Indians to their early exposure to 
property and contract rights as landholders on the islands.60 Land 
sales financed the emigration of West Indians, who upon arrival 
in the U.S. took advantage of their experiences to acquire land and 
build wealth—at substantially greater proportions than “native” 
African Americans.61 Interestingly, Caribbean families often 
became landlords to local African Americans.62 
The relationship between Korean Americans and African 
Americans in the wigs and hair extensions market is even more 
visibly different because it is interracial. Of course, no discussion 
of Korean American–African American relations is complete 
 
56 See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying discussion. 
57 See infra note 198 and accompanying discussion. 
58 Some scholars would place structural and cultural views in the same 
category, one emphasizing that certain institutions and cultural features 
determine behavior. At the other end is the agency or functionalist view, which 
emphasizes that individuals create institutions to serve their interests and 
needs. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN 
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 12–13 (2006). 
59 See Brown, supra note 8. 
60 Id. at 41–42. 
61 Id. at 49. 
62 Id. at 52 n.90. 
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without mentioning that for all the relative difference in their 
stations, both are peoples of color excluded from participation in 
the mainstream economy. Therefore, their interactions have often 
been pushed to niches in urban landscapes where frictions are 
bound to arise.63 Smoldering for decades, these frictions  exploded 
into riots in Los Angeles in 1992, when Korean American 
businesses were vandalized after the acquittal of the White police 
officers who beat Rodney King and the Korean American 
storeowner who shot Latasha Harlins.64 Law scholars with a 
structuralist bent were quick to underscore the similarities in 
systemic exclusion of both Asian Americans and African 
Americans, frequently with the blessing if not at the direction of 
the state.65 Asian American legal scholars, who were gaining 
prominence in the academy, called for the emergence of critical 
Asian American scholarship in the tradition of critical race 
theory.66 For all the shared legacy of discrimination and exclusion, 
however, when Korean American and African American 
interactions assume market dimensions, such as buyer–seller 
transactions, tensions can be exacerbated.67 
 
63 See Kwang Chung Kim & Shin Kim, The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles 
Unrest in 1992, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD: CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 
17 (Kwang Chung Kim ed., 1999); Yoon, supra note 12, at 328. 
64 Kyeyoung Park, Use and Abuse of Race and Culture: Black-Korean Tension in 
America, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD: CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 60 
(Kwang Chung Kim ed., 1999); Melvin L. Oliver et al., Anatomy of a Rebellion: A 
Political-Economic Analysis, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN 
UPRISING 117 (Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., 1993). See also Genaro Molina, 
How the Killing of Latasha Harlins Changed South L.A., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2016. 
65 See, e.g., Sumi K. Cho, Korean Americans vs. African Americans: Conflict and 
Construction, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING 196 (Robert 
Gooding-Williams, ed., 1993); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in 
the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed “Los 
Angeles”, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993); Reginald Leamon Robinson, “The Other 
Against Itself”: Deconstructing the Violent Discourse between Korean and African 
Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1993). 
66 See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical 
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241 (1993). 
67 Kim & Kim, supra note 60. 
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From the structuralists, this Article extrapolates the lesson 
that ethnically misaligned buyers and sellers are pushed into close 
quarters by racial and macroeconomic forces. Departing from this 
starting point, however, the Article also scrutinizes the efforts of 
Korean American sellers to maintain the dominance that systemic 
forces conveyed them. To explain the persistence of ethnic 
misalignment, especially in the face of challenges to sellers by out-
group upstarts, the Article turns toward endogenous or bottom-
up perspectives to examine mechanisms adopted by in-group 
sellers. While this approach might be out of fashion in legal 
circles, given the popularity of systemic analyses, it is consistent 
with more recent sociological work, which has emphasized the 
agency of ethnic entrepreneurs.68 
B.  Contributions from Sociology 
 
Sociology laid the foundation for ethnicity and 
entrepreneurship, providing basic definitions and theoretical 
frameworks.69 To this day, much of the innovative scholarship on 
ethnic markets resides in sociology. In 1967, Hubert Blalock 
devised the term middleman minority to describe minority 
entrepreneurs who mediate between dominant and subordinate 
groups.70 This concept became indelibly associated with Edna 
Bonacich, who posited that middlemen minorities succeed 
because they are sojourners or economic migrants intent on 
saving aggressively.71 Together with Ivan Light, Professor 
Bonacich conducted a series of ethnographic studies on Korean 
 
68 See infra Section II.B. 
69 On basic definitions of, and the link between, ethnicity and entrepreneurship, 
for example, see Howard E. Aldrich & Roger Waldinger, Ethnicity and 
Entrepreneurship, 16 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. 111, 112 (1990) (defining “ethnic 
group” as membership in a group with a common origin and culture that is 
reinforced by social structures and “entrepreneurship” as combining resources 
in novel ways to create something of value). 
70 HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 79 
(1967). 
71 See Bonacich, supra note 10. 
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Americans, finding that this community exhibits high rates of 
entrepreneurship relative to other ethnic groups.72 Korean 
American firms compete by employing family members at low 
wages, thereby utilizing social networks to amass capital and 
control expenses.73 Their businesses also gravitate toward certain 
sectors (e.g., retail) and neighborhoods (e.g., impoverished or 
lower middle class).74 
The middleman minority framework broadened into an 
ethnic or immigrant entrepreneur framework to encompass non-
sojourning communities.75 Subsequent studies on Korean 
American entrepreneurs added to Light and Bonacich’s 
observations, confirming that low-margin retail businesses in 
low-income neighborhoods function as the entry-point for most 
Korean Americans, who, after having saved enough, trade up for 
ventures in more prestigious industries and higher-income 
neighborhoods.76 These scholars also compiled a more 
sophisticated portrait of Korean American small businesses that 
relate their success back to two additional factors: (i) bilateral 
trade between the U.S. and Korea, which facilitated the import of 
manufactured goods from Korea and enabled Korean Americans 
to construct retail infrastructures for those goods;  and (ii) a high 
degree of vertical integration of retail and import, which achieved 
efficiencies—but also fostered exclusion of out-group 
competitors.77 
 
72 See LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11. 
73 Id. at 185–86; Yoon, supra note 12, at 328–29. 
74 LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 179–84, 
205–26. 
75 See id. at 18. The sense of perpetual foreignness engendered by the immigrant 
framework would have been damaging to the very groups these sociologists 
studied. For a fuller discussion of the theories of ethnic economies, see IVAN 
LIGHT & STEVEN J. GOLD, ETHNIC ECONOMIES 5–23 (2000). 
76 Jennifer Lee, Retail niche domination among African American, Jewish, and Korean 
entrepreneurs: Competition, coethnic advantage; and disadvantage, 42 AM. BEHAV. 
SCI. 1398 (1999). 
77 Id. See also NANCY ABELMANN & JOHN LIE, BLUE DREAMS: KOREAN AMERICANS 
AND THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS 136 (1995). 
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The paradigm shift to ethnic and immigrant entrepreneurs 
paved the way for ethnographies of other communities, often in 
fascinating contradistinction from co-racial groups. Scholars 
compared entrepreneurship rates and strategies of Cuban 
Americans to Mexican Americans, for instance, or Mexican 
Americans to African Americans.78 By unpacking the 
intersections of ethnicity with race, class, and gender, they have 
been able to distinguish ethnic communities prone to 
entrepreneurship from racialized minorities who, due to 
structural conditions or the absence of class and ethnic resources, 
could not replicate the conditions necessary for widespread 
business formation.79  
Undertaking comparative analyses, sociologists ascertained 
that some ethnic groups thrived because they were able to 
integrate vertically and horizontally.80 Writing in 1982, Kenneth 
Wilson and Allen Martin theorized that ethnic communities 
utilizing in-group networks to organize in this way could 
replicate the advantages of dominant firms in the mainstream 
economy to squeeze out higher profits per unit of demand.81 As 
proof, they applied input–output econometric analyses to 
compare the production capacities of Cuban Americans and 
African Americans in Miami, finding that the former can source 
from in-group firms and retain capital within co-ethnic 
communities at far higher rates than the latter.82 Vertical 
integration has been observed between Korean American retailers 
and suppliers as well.83 
 
78 See ZULEMA VALDEZ, THE NEW ENTREPRENEURS: HOW RACE, CLASS, AND 
GENDER SHAPE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 26 (2011). 
79 For a concise literature review, see Valdez, supra note 11, at 158. 
80 See Kenneth L. Wilson & W. Allen Martin, Ethnic Enclaves: A Comparison of the 
Cuban and Black Economies in Miami, 88 AM. J. SOCIOL. 135 (1982). 
81 Id. at 138. 
82 Id. at 143–47. 
83 See Yoon, supra note 12, at 331: 
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As we assemble the literature on ethnically segmented 
markets, it is important to be mindful of sociology. Sociology 
keeps legal scholars “honest” about ethnicity, so to speak, by 
helping us stay attuned to the dynamism of racial and ethnic 
formation.84 Recognizing that race and ethnicity are constructs 
whose boundaries are fluid, we understand that the interethnic 
conflict in ESM markets is not inevitable. Indeed, the static 
representation of ethnicity—and therefore the inevitability of 
ethnic conflict—was one of the many criticisms of Professor 
Chua’s writings.85 Generations pass and their descendants 
acculturate; whatever the values or inclinations of first-generation 
immigrant entrepreneurs, their children may feel differently 
about the communities where they do business.86 
In return, there is much that antitrust can teach sociologists as 
well. The literature on vertical integration in ethnic economies is 
 
The vertical integration between Korean retailers and 
suppliers is another strong feature of Korean immigrant 
businesses . . . . Korean retailers say that they receive some 
benefits or special services from Korean suppliers. For 
example, extended credit terms, lower prices and easy access 
to information are the main benefits gained from having 
Korean suppliers. Since Korean suppliers dominate general 
merchandise, clothing, footwear, and wig trades, Korean 
retailers can get early information about which items have 
recently arrived and which ones are “hot.” 
84 On the process of racial formation, see OMI & WINANT, supra note 22. 
85 See Edmund Terrence Gomez, Inter-ethnic Relations, Business and Identity: The 
Chinese in Britain and Malaysia, in THE STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND IDENTITY IN 
MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES: ETHNICITY, EQUITY AND THE NATION 32 (Nicholas 
Tarling & Edmund Terrence Gomez eds., 2008) (“[Chua’s] perspective tends to 
homogenize ethnic communities and to essentialize their pattern of enterprise 
development”); Miles, Chinese Diasporas, pp 256-257 
86 See Elaine H. Kim, Home is Where the Han Is: A Korean American Perspective on 
the Los Angeles Upheavals, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING 
215 (Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., 1993). Concomitantly, we also see that 
traumatic episodes such as the LA riots can accentuate ethnic solidarity. Rose 
M. Kim, Violence and Trauma as Constitutive Elements in Korean American Racial 
Identity Formation: The 1992 L.A. Riots/Insurrection/Saigu, 11 ETHNIC & RACIAL 
STUD. 1999 (2011). 
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now nearly half a century old.87 Some of it treats horizontal 
coordination and vertical integration equivalently,88 as 
tantamount to a monopoly.89 These are fighting words in 
antitrust; there, the doctrine has developed frameworks for 
thinking through when monopolies ensue, what monopolization 
is, and when coordination and integration should be condemned. 
 
C.  Contributions from Economics 
 
Economics is fundamental to our understanding of markets, 
and economic principles heavily influence antitrust. For our 
purposes, three lines of economic scholarship are informative. 
First, there has been a longstanding debate about the relevance of 
antidiscrimination laws—from an economics perspective. Among 
the earliest, and certainly the loudest, volleys fired on this point 
came from the Chicago economist Gary Becker, who posited that 
racial discrimination is inefficient because it artificially steers 
transactions toward in-group members rather than permitting 
out-group but more efficient alternatives.90 For instance, White 
employers with a “taste for discrimination” might hire only White 
workers even though Black workers might be more productive 
and demand lower wages.91 Over time, as his theory goes, the 
markets would correct the distortions of discrimination by, with 
nondiscriminators driving discriminators out of business.92 In the 
 
87 A similar strain is the “ethnic cartel” model. For a discussion, see RICHMAN, 
STATELESS COMMERCE supra note 9, at 107–08. 
88 See Wilson & Martin, supra note 77, at 137. 
89 See LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 76, at 20–21 (“Korean business owners 
monopolized the wig business before federal prosecutors brought suit under 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. While they enjoyed their monopoly, Korean 
business owners excluded non-Koreans from the wig industry, and raised 
prices of wigs to consumers.”). 
90 See BECKER, supra note 4. 
91 Id. at 19–21. 
92 Id. at 43–45. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1 
(1972). 
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above example, White employers would eventually gravitate 
toward Black workers, forcing a stabilization of wages between 
White and Black workers. With the markets’ self-correction, 
antidiscrimination laws were unnecessary.93 
Becker’s thesis came at the height of U.S. antidiscrimination 
laws and ushered in a conservative backlash rooted in shaky 
microeconomic theory. The thesis has been thoroughly qualified, 
if not utterly discredited,94 though Professor Becker’s other 
writings have influenced scholarship of ethnic entrepreneurs.95 
For our purposes, and as our second line of scholarship to 
examine, it is the related discourse on the durability of market 
segmentation that is more relevant. The lesson from the early 
microeconomics-infused lens on race is that segregation is 
inefficient.96 As time takes its course, transactions should proceed 
toward the equilibrium of efficiency. This hypothesis applies to 
various settings, with the common theme that markets and 
communities should move toward integration. Thus, across vastly 
different industries, market segmentation is viewed as an 
aberration. Financial markets are inefficient where producers are 
siloed, fostering redundancy in market infrastructures.97 Labor 
unions are interpreted as artificial in addition to unjust where 
 
93 See BECKER, supra note 4, at 45.  
94 See, e.g., Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial 
Inequality, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2005). 
95 See, e.g., Richman, Community Institutions, supra note 50, at 387–88 (accounting 
for the possibility that that Jewish institutions developed and internalized 
knowledge that allowed Jewish merchants to flourish in the diamond trade, in 
accordance with Becker’s theory of human capital suggests); Cao, Communities 
and Markets, supra note 9, at 865 n.84 (incorporating Becker’s work on norms 
into an understanding of community norms surrounding informal contracts). 
96 Becker himself posited that tastes for discrimination might grow large 
enough to foster segregation and pre-empt intercommunal trade, to the 
detriment of each isolated community’s welfare. See BECKER, supra note 4, at 
22–23. 
97 See Mike Reece, Competition or Consolidation?: The Outlook for Interoperability 
Among European CCPs, THOUGHT (J.P. Morgan), May 1, 2012 (comparing the 
siloed nature of financial market infrastructures in Europe versus the U.S.). 
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peoples of color are excluded.98 And trade barriers, a form of 
geographic market segregation, are construed as artificial 
distortions of price, which should otherwise trend toward 
uniformity.99 
In diverse societies, then, the persistence of ethnically 
segmented markets might be attributed to unnatural forces such 
as interethnic suspicion. In Malawi, for example, the political 
scientist Amanda Lea Robinson has analyzed the spatial 
distribution of the country’s numerous ethnic groups and 
concluded that ethnic market segmentation is partially the result 
of intraethnic trust.100 To minimize the risks of informal 
commerce, farmers and traders opt to transact only with in-group 
counterparties.101  
Nonetheless, ethnic groups can come to so dominate an 
economic niche that consumers cannot turn to coethnic suppliers. 
For an explanation, and as our third line of scholarship to 
examine, some economists have turned to institutions peculiar to 
those ethnicities. New institutional economics (“NIE”) defines 
institutions as “written and unwritten rules, norms and 
constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control 
their environment.”102 Broadly construed, institutions cover 
written rules and agreements governing private relations, 
constitutions and laws governing society, and unwritten codes of 
conduct.103 In his seminal book on institutions, for instance, Avner 
Greif traces Western dominance to the development of 
institutions during the medieval era that fostered growth.104 Most 
 
98 Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 51. 
99 See Robinson, supra note 5 (discussing the Law of One Price, which 
hypothesizes that each product should have one price globally and where 
disparities arise, they are due to trade frictions). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Claud Menard & Mary M. Shirley, Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claud Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008). 
103 Id. 
104 See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: 
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006). 
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prominently, it was the rise of corporations such as guilds, 
fraternities, and professional organizations—institutions 
institution centered neither on state nor kin but on self-interest 
and self-governance—that propelled Europe’s growth.105  
Given its emphasis on hard and soft law as institutions 
fundamental to economic success, NIE has provided the 
foundations for law scholars’ studies of ethnic economies.106 As 
we shall see, institutions spurred the ascension of Korean 
merchants’ in the African American wigs and hair extensions 
market. However, we will also move beyond intraethnic and 
communal factors to evaluate Korean American strategies for 
keeping competitors at bay. Because the market for the sale of 
wigs and hair extensions to African Americans is ethnically 
misaligned between consumers and producers, we must consider 
the part that producers played in maintaining their edge over out-
group competitors—specifically, African American retailers, 
whom consumers would likely have preferred. 
Altogether, prior writings from law, sociology, and 
economics point to the following quandary for ESM markets: 
given the dynamism of racial and ethnic formation as well as the 
transience and inefficiency of market segmentation, why are some 
ethnically segmented markets perpetually misaligned? Existing 
work (e.g., by NIE scholars) provides partial answers. But to fully 
explicate this quandary, the remainder of the Article focuses on 
one of the country’s most iconic but misunderstood ESM markets. 
  
 
105 Id. See also Avner Greif, Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins 
and Implications of Western Corporations, 96 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 308 (2006). 
106 See, e.g., RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE supra at 91, 169. 
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III.  THE Market FOR AFRICAN WIGS AND HAIR EXTENSIONS 
 
Wigs and hair extensions manufactured for African American 
consumption comprise an ethnically segmented product market. 
African American hair is unique in texture and remarkably 
versatile, capable of being molded into different styles as an 
expression of personal style.107 Yet with this versatility comes 
fragility; excessive styling weakens the hair shaft so consumers 
often cannot use products designed for other hair types.108 
Products catering to African American hair, therefore, are 
generally not substitutable by hair products for other ethnic 
groups.109 
Unlike many other consumer products, however, wigs and 
hair extensions are sold in an ethnically misaligned market 
because retailers are predominantly firms owned by Korean 
Americans. In the U.S., this is one of the most enduring markets 
where buyers and sellers are ethnically misaligned. 
 
107 Ingrid E. Roseborough & Amy J. McMichael, Hair Care Practices in African-
American Patients, 28 SEMIN CUTAN. MED. SURG. 103, (2009): 
 
The unique properties of hair of African origin are conducive 
to the expression of personal style.T he curved, elliptically-
shaped hair shaft lends itself to mouldable styles that retain 
their form and texture. When heat or chemical agents are 
applied to African hair, thes trands temporarily or 
permanently release their intrinsic coil properties and can be 
fashioned in innumerable ways. This immense diversity of 
options for hair care is not without drawbacks. African hair is 
innately fragile. The inappropriate use of styling aids may 
weaken the hair shaft and lead to breakage, scalp 
inflammation, and potentially permanent hair loss. 
 
108 Id. 
109 For example, African American hair generally requires more conditioning 
to prevent dryness. For wigs and hair extensions, styles with tighter curl 
pattern will generally be used more by African American consumers than 
white or Asian consumers. 
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Equally enduring is the interethnic tension that typifies 
consumer–producer interactions. (By “producers,” this Article 
refers generally to retailers of wigs and hair extensions for African 
Americans.) Understandably, the fact that Korean Americans 
dominate the sale of beauty products manufactured for African 
Americans has been the source of consumer ire for decades. 
Among other criticisms, African Americans routinely level 
generalizations that these markets are concentrated and Koreans 
have monopolized them.110 Pervasive as these charges are, the 
stranger feature is that they have  been repeated by scholars—
often the scholars who built up the middleman minority 
literature—without working through the prerequisites of 
monopoly and monopolization.111 
This Section analyzes the retail of wigs and hair extensions to 
African American as a paradigm of ESM markets. It begins with 
the structural dynamics that propelled Korean American firms 
into the markets. Then it discusses the tactics that these firms 
utilize to sustain their control. Finally, with a view toward 
infusing the discourse with greater methodological rigor, this 
Section dissects the market power of Korean American retailers. 
A.  Structural Tailwinds 
 
Today’s Korean American hair retailers owe their start to 
macroeconomic changes at the domestic and international levels 
in the late 1960s. Half a century ago, when South Korean 
 
110 See, e.g., Emma Sapong, Roots of Tension: Race, Hair, Competition and Black 
Beauty Stores, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO NEWS, Apr. 25, 2017, 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/04/25/black-beauty-shops-korean-
suppliers-roots-of-tension-mn [https://perma.cc/EG7Y-DU7X]; GOOD HAIR 
(HBO Films 2009); BLACK HAIR (2006), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p96aaTSdrAE; Lloneau, supra note 16. 
See also BLACK OWNED HAIR CHALLENGE, 
https://www.blackownedhaircarechallenge.com/ (last accessed July 30, 
2020). 
111 See, e.g., LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 76, at 20–21. 
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underwent its rapid economic development,112 wigs became one 
of the country’s major exports.113 Hair collectors traveled the 
countryside of South Korea, offering cash to or even bartering 
with women and girls in exchange for their hair.114 Shorn hair was 
bundled and sold to wholesalers, who then resold it to wig 
factories. Wig manufacturing is labor-intensive: hair must be 
combed and sorted for length; if the hair is natural, it must also be 
disinfected, washed, curled, and dyed; finally, hair is then sewn 
onto a cloth netting.115 Yet wage imbalances allowed wigs to be 
made in South Korea, imported into the U.S., and then sold at 
large markups.116 
By a twist of history, South Korean wig exports were greased 
by anti-Communist policy during the Cold War. In the early 
1960s, at the height of a hairpiece craze in the U.S., European 
supplies of hair ran low, so U.S. manufacturers began to source 
hair from China.117 In 1965, however, the U.S. Treasury 
Department suddenly banned the import of “Asiatic” hair, but 
hair was allowed through the embargo if it could be traced to a 
non-Communist source.118 This move boosted the South Korean 
wig industry while undercutting its Asian competitors.  
Initially, South Korean wig imports were fueled by an 
explosion in consumer demand, which grew 50-fold from 1960 to 
1969.119 At that time, the market was expanding so quickly that 
 
112 See GREGG BRAZINSKY, NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH KOREA: KOREANS, 
AMERICANS, AND THE MAKING OF A DEMOCRACY (2007).  
113 LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 266 
(“Korea exported 70 percent of the world’s human-hair wigs.”). 
114 Petrulis, supra note 15, at 8. See also How Wigs Tell the Story of Modern South 
Korea, ECONOMIST, Jul. 27, 2017. 
115 Loretta Hall, Wig, How Products Are Made, 
http://www.madehow.com/Volume-3/Wig.html (last accessed July 30, 
2020). 
116 See LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 27–37; 
Chin et al., supra note 15, at 494. 
117 Petrulis, supra note 15, at 13. 
118 Id. at 14–15. 
119 See Leslie Gourse, What a Change of Hair Can Do, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1969. 
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U.S. firms set up subsidiaries and stepped up sourcing.120 Hong 
Kong and South Korean businesses also rushed in. What 
distinguished the Korean-operated supply chain from its U.S. and 
Hong Kong counterparts, however, was its reliance on an 
extensive network of large manufacturers, small distributors, and 
a government-backed bank that stretched from South Korea to the 
U.S.121 State support was critical. Funded by the South Korean 
government, the Korean Exchange Bank established a branch in 
Los Angeles to lend to Korean American-owned firms, many of 
them situated in the wig industry.122 The bank even encouraging 
these firms to borrow, thereby swelling the number of wig trading 
companies in the early 1970s.123 
Korean-owned businesses in the U.S. built up a network of 
wig wholesalers and retailers, all relying on each other. Korean-
language newspapers circulating in the U.S. advertised the 
enterprises of Korean immigrants, which helped connect 
immigrants; Korean importers also recruited Korean immigrants 
as distributors.124 Newcomers to the wig business could navigate 
both financing and sourcing solely within the transnational 
Korean community. Hence, social networks linked the disparate 
players in the wig market. 
The late 1960s and 1970s also coincided with shifting beauty 
standards. This was the era of full beards and long hair, reflecting 
an ethos of rebellion. For those consumers unable to naturally 
look the part, hairpieces provided a substitute—though a costly 
one. At the time, wigs were sourced from human hair, and Italian 
 
120 Chin et al., supra note 15, at 494. 
121 Id. at 499–501. 
122 Id. at 498. 
123 Id. at 499. 
124 Yoon, supra note 12, at 322 (“Korean manufacturers sent their sales 
representatives to black areas to open retail stores. Korean wig-importers 
actively recruited Korean immigrants as retailers and peddlers in black areas 
to expand their businesses. They even supplied wigs to Korean retailers on 
credit, so that Korean immigrants could start their own wig businesses with 
very little initial capital.”). 
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hair was considered topshelf, with “Oriental” hair a distant 
second.125 Mixing animal hair was already in practice to concoct 
even cheaper alternatives.126 However, it was the invention of 
Kanekalon by the Japanese conglomerate Kanekan in 1965 that 
proved disruptive.127  
Possibly intended as a wool substitute,128 and modeled on 
Union Carbide’s fibers for fake fur and doll hair,129 Kanekalon 
was a synthetic thread that became an inexpensive substitute for 
human hair. Korean wig manufacturers acquired the exclusive 
right to use the thread and incorporated it into their products.130 
Along with the technical breakthrough of stretch wigs, or hair 
attached onto elastic caps,131 Kanekalon  helped South Korea 
transform from an source of human hair to a manufacturer of 
wigs.132 By the mid-1970s, wigs had become South Korea’s third 
 
125 A direct, if lengthy, quote from a chronicler of the time is illuminating on 
multiple levels: 
 
[T]raditional pacesetters are the hairpieces from Europe, led 
by soft, shiny, olive-oil-nurtured Italian hair. It is far and away 
the most expensive, with falls starting as high as $300 and full 
wigs going for as much as $1,000 . . . . Spanish hair has been 
under something of a cloud since the days when gypsies were 
accused of kidnapping long-haired children, and returning 
them shortn . . . . Oriental hair is in general coarser than the 
European variety, and cheaper. A hairpiece of Oriental hair 
costs roughly a third of the price of a comparable European 
piece. Gourse, supra note 112, at 67-69. 
 
126 See id. at 69. 
127 See About Kaneka, Kaneka, 
https://www.kaneka.co.jp/en/corporate/chronicle/ (click on “1960~”). 
128 Brooklyn White, How Black Women Fueled Kanekalon Hair’s Enduring Impact 
on Pop Culture, StyleCaster, https://stylecaster.com/beauty/kanekalon-hair-
history/. 
129 Gourse, supra note 112, at 69. 
130 Yoon, supra note 12, at 111. 
131 Gourse, supra note 112, at 69. 
132 Chin et al., supra note 15, at 495. 
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largest export.133 For consumer standpoint, Kanekalon provided 
a low-cost alternative to natural wigs, putting conformity to 
fashion trends within nearly universal reach.134 
For African American women, who comprise a very specific 
market segment, the mid-1970s marked a shift from the afros that 
had defined the Civil Rights era to longer, straighter hair.135 This 
was reflected in the cultural icons of the day, including Diana Ross 
and Donna Summer.136 Of course, hair is an individual’s 
expression of identity, so we must not overgeneralize. We do 
know, however, that emerging sources of natural and synthetic 
hair from Asia brought down the prices of wigs, enabling more 
consumers to look the era’s part. At a time when relaxers and 
straight hair were coming back into style, synthetic wigs allowed 
African American women to quickly change up hairstyles.137  
Synthetic wigs therefore ushered in throwaway fashion for 
hair—a boon to Korean American wig retailers, who in the mid-
1970s were suffering from the deflation of their products, an 
economic recession, weakening consumer demand, and 
intensifying intraethnic competition.138 Henceforth, these retailers 
would have to do volume business to make up for diminishing 
margins. Yet were it not for African American women, South 
Korean manufacturers and Korean American retailers would 
likely not have survived. In less than half a decade, consumption 
 
133 Id. at 496. 
134 See Gourse, supra note 112, at 69 (synthetic wigs cost $25, as opposed to the 
$300 price tag for wigs from natural hair). 
135 Previously, the late 1960s and early 1970s was the “golden era of wigs.” 
Yoon, supra note 12, at 323. 
136 For annals of their hair evolution, see Nikki Brown, Diana Ross’ Unmatched 
Hair Journey Through The Years, ESSENCE, Feb. 8, 2017, 
https://www.essence.com/celebrity/diana-ross-hair-journey/; Nicole Marie 
Melton, Hairstyle File: Donna Summer's Iconic Tresses, ESSENCE, May 18, 2012, 
https://www.essence.com/hair/hairstyle-file-donna-summers-tress-
transformation/.  
137 See AYANA BYRD & LORI THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF 
BLACK HAIR IN AMERICA 70–71 (2001). 
138 YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13. 
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of wigs in the U.S. contracted by nearly 40 percent, to a “core” 
constituent of African Americans.139 This group comprised a 
lucrative and dependable segment, and because of the inroads 
Korean Americans had already made into the market, they would 
not be displaced. 
Other seismic but fortuitous trends allowed Korean American 
firms to consolidate control over the wigs and hair extensions 
markets. As whites fled American cities, Korean American 
retailers set up convenient stores, liquor stores, and hair care 
businesses, taking advantage of cheap rents to open storefronts.140 
Brick and mortar establishments gave owners direct access to the 
consumers who would form their base, so that when styles 
shifted, firms could quickly adapt by switching to newer 
products. In this way, the early foray of Korean American retailers 
conveyed this set of producers a first mover advantage which 
made them difficult to unseat.141 Their entry into the community 
also signified the demise of door-to-door retailing of the 1930s, the 
mainstay of black retailers who sold black-made beauty products 
directly to black consumers.142 In their place stood the brick and 
mortar store, where Korean American retailers sold beauty 
supplies manufactured in Korea to black consumers.143 
Of all the structural tailwinds enjoyed by Korean American 
retailers, however, it is their comparative advantage over African 
American competitors that has kept them ahead. In many 
respects, a comparison of these two communities is a study in 
contrasts. Where one group of producers has access to capital, 
whether through rotating communal credit or state-backed 
import–export banks, the other is shut out of mortgages, let alone 
 
139 Petrulis, supra note 15, at 5. 
140 See Sapong, supra note 107. 
141 See id. 
142 See BYRD & THARPS, supra note 130, at 32, 79 
143 Id. at 34. 
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business credit.144 Where one group enjoys the patronage of a 
sovereign government that during the 1960s was still a quasi-
developing country but threw its entire weight behind its ethnic 
compatriots, the other group has faced the systematic exclusion, 
marginalization, and persecution by its own state, a world 
superpower. No study of this ethnically misaligned market would 
be complete without reference to the disparity in buyer and seller 
economic power, and no study of that economic power would be 
complete without mention of the headwinds African American 
businesses perpetually face. 
Nonetheless, Korean American dominance cannot be entirely 
chalked up to structural or institutional advantages. The 
innovation and success of African American entrepreneurs such 
as Madam C.J. Walker, who pioneered hair straightening 
products and a direct retailing strategy, shows that African 
Americans can break through.145 Nor is Walker an anomaly; 
numerous other Black-owned hair care businesses have 
flourished despite the headwinds.146 For Korean American 
retailers, then, we must also look at the role that this group played 
in fanning those headwinds. 
 
B.  The Agency of Retailers 
 
Structural trends may convey one set of producers an 
advantage over others, but the advantages are ephemeral. 
Structures shift, and advantages dissipate. This is especially the 
case when producers and consumers are both communities of 
color; the slight, relative advantages conveyed to each group 
 
144 Cf. Yoon, supra note 12, at 494, with RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: 
A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 9–10 
(2017). 
145 BYRD & THARPS, supra note 130, at 35–36, 78–81. Walker was the first Black 
self-made female millionaire. Id. at 183. 
146 See Black-Owned Brands, BLACK OWNED HAIR CHALLENGE, 
https://www.blackownedhaircarechallenge.com/black-owned-brands/ (last 
accessed July 30, 2020). 
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fades quickly, and relations between ethnically distinct producers 
and consumers are ever fluid.147 In other words, the dominance of 
Korean American retailers could not have persisted through the 
decades without the tactics utilized by Korean American retailers 
themselves—i.e., without their agency. 
For African American consumers in this ethnically 
misaligned market, the offenses of out-group producers are 
many. Consumers charge that Korean Americans have 
monopolized the ethnic beauty products market,148 shutting out 
African American retailers by stifling the flow from 
wholesalers.149 And if African Americans have created new 
beauty products, Korean American retailers refuse to carry 
them.150 African Americans have leveled so many charges at 
Korean American retailers that the Internet is replete with these 
claims and the producer–consumer relationship is clouded by a 
generalized, if amorphous, mistrust.151  
In truth, the relationship between African American 
consumers and Korean American suppliers had been poised for 
decades, for reasons beyond the inability of competitors to 
penetrate the hair markets.152 African Americans had long 
 
147 See supra note 82. 
148 Lloneau, supra note 16 (“The Koreans control over 85% of all ethnic hair care 
products sold in Beauty Supply Stores without regard as to who is the 
manufacture.”). 
149 MadameNoire, Why Do Koreans Own The Black Beauty Supply Business?, Sept. 
27, 2010, https://madamenoire.com/104753/why-do-koreans-own-the-black-
beauty-supply-business/ [https://perma.cc/AKY3-VF56 ] (“Today, there are 
over 9,000 Korean-owned beauty supply stores serving a billion dollar market 
for Black hair. Between manufacturing, distributing and selling these hair care 
products, Korean entrepreneurs appear to control all major components. . . . 
[T]here are only four central distributors serving beauty supply stores in the 
country and these Korean owned distributors discriminate against Black store 
owners in order to maintain their monopoly in the market.”). 
150 See BLACK HAIR, supra note 107. 
151 See supra notes 106, 141. 
152 See CLAIRE JEAN KIM, BITTER FRUIT: THE POLITICS OF BLACK–KOREAN 
CONFLICT IN NEW YORK CITY (2000); Heon Cheol Lee, Conflict between Korean 
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complained of mistreatment by Korean-owned businesses and 
periodically organized boycotts against them.153 In 1992, these old 
grievances exploded into protests that destroyed Korean 
businesses in Los Angeles after the acquittal of Latasha Harlins’s 
killer and Rodney King’s assailants.154 
Charges of exclusion find some support in the literature from 
sociology about ethnic entrepreneurship. Consistent with Wilson 
and Martin’s finding that Cuban American entrepreneurs pool 
resources within their co-ethnic communities,155 Korean 
American retailers deal almost exclusively with Korean and 
Korean American wholesalers.156 Wholesalers are more likely to 
extend credit, offer installment payment plans, and sell at lower 
prices to co-ethnic retailers, which can be important to thinly 
capitalized startups.157 A degree of informality characterizes 
Korean American in-group commercial transactions; rather than 
checking a supplier’s credit, wholesalers often transact through 
“handshake deals.”158 These busines customs are emblematic of 
what sociologists call “vertical integration,” whereby materials 
are sourced from, spending restricted to, and wealth retained in 
co-ethnic communities.159 Conceptually, the application of 
vertical integration to an entire ethnic group is slightly different 
than the approach of antitrust law, which tends to examine 
vertical integration at the firm or industry level. Nonetheless, 
ethnic cohesion characterizes Korean American ventures in a 
variety of industries, mostly concentrated in low-income 
communities of color, from apparel to ethnic beauty supplies. 
 
Merchants and Black Customers: A Structural Analysis, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD: 
CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 113 (Kwang Chung Kim ed., 1999). 
153 See KIM, supra note 145, at 145–46. 
154 See Park, supra note 61; Oliver et al., supra note 61. 
155 See Wilson & Martin, supra note 77. 
156 Lee, supra note 73. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id.; Wilson & Martin, supra note 77. 
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While a vertically integrated wig and hair extensions market 
keeps wealth from flowing out of the Korean American 
community, it excludes participation by African American 
competitors. Given the market’s evolution, very few African 
American suppliers of wigs and hair products exist,160 and they 
have been unable to procure hair products from Korean American 
distributors.161 African American manufacturers have also faced 
difficulty convincing Korean American retailers to carry their 
products.162 This can be attributed partly to language barriers; for 
product catalogs and even industry magazines are frequently 
published only in Korean.163 Yet Korean and Korean American 
wholesalers have banded together in the past to shut out 
competitors, going well beyond the passive exclusion of 
language. 
In 1975, the Department of Justice brought suit against the 
Korean Hair Goods Association of America, Inc. (the 
“Association”) for (i) conspiring to regulate the price and resale 
conditions of imported wigs and (ii) excluding wig importers and 
distributors from the resale market.164 The Association was a New 
York organization whose members imported wigs and hair 
products from Korea for wholesale and retail in the U.S.165 Noting 
that most wigs sold in the U.S. are made out of synthetic fibers 
 




161 MadameNoire, supra note 142. 
162 See BLACK HAIR, supra note 107, at frame 5:50 (Kizure, a Black-owned 
manufacturer of curling irons and other styling tools, allegedly blacklisted 
from Korean American-owned shops). 
163 See, e.g., BEAUTY TIMES: THE MAGAZINE FOR THE ETHNIC BEAUTY INDUSTRY, 
http://www.beautytimes.com/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2020). See also BLACK HAIR, 
supra note 107, at frame 2:57. 
164 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Notice of Proposed Consent Judgment and 
Competitive Impact Statement Thereon, 40 Fed. Reg. 57696 (1975) [hereinafter 
DOJ Consent Decree Notice]. 
165 Id. at 57698. 
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and that the “vast majority” of synthetic wigs are manufactured 
in South Korea and imported to the U.S.,166 the Department of 
Justice contended that the Association regulated the price and 
distribution of wigs by restricting its membership and working 
with an association South Korean wig manufacturers and 
exporters (the “KEA”) to channel the distribution of wigs through 
the Association.167 Although DOJ brought suit under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act,168 this was a scheme of using exclusion to 
facilitate price maintenance, as seen in classic Section 2 cases.169 In 
the end, the consent decree enjoined the Association from: (i) 
fixing wig prices, (ii) preventing the procurement of wigs for 
resale, informational exchanges designed to fix prices, (iii) 
communicating its membership to the KEA, and (iv) 
unreasonably restricting its membership.170 
The Association’s consent decree offered a lens into how the 
Korean American distribution chain for wigs and hair extensions 
was able to consolidate its hand in the U.S. market. However, it is 
tantalizingly short. It also stands as the only proceeding that 
delves into the workings of this market with any rigor. Ultimately, 
the Justice Department’s legal action shows that the charges of 
African American consumers and competitors are not mere 
speculation—that as far back as 1972, the Korean American 
distribution chain was attempting to fix prices and resale 
conditions for wigs and hair extensions.171 To fill in the analytical 
gaps in the consent decree and infuse the charges of African 
American consumers and competitors with rigor, we must work 
through the requisite steps under antitrust law. Otherwise, the 





168 See U.S. v. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., 1976 WL 1219 (S.D.N.Y.). 
169 E.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 
(1984); JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc. (7th Cir. 1999). 
170 Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., 1976 WL. 
171 40 Fed. Reg. at 57698. 
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IV.  Market POWER OF KOREAN AMERICAN RETAILERS 
 
This Section uses antitrust theory and doctrine on market 
power to more clearly frame the presence of Korean American 
retailers. To be condemned, many exclusionary and coordinating 
practices require a finding of market power as the very first 
step.172 Market power is easy to express conceptually—the power 
of a producer to raise prices above competitive levels—but often 
difficult to prove in practice.173  
Frequently, market power is gauged through the indirect 
steps of defining the relevant market and then measuring the 
defendants’ market shares. While the market definition/market 
share paradigm has come under assault through the decades,174 it 
remains the most popular means of assessing market power. 
More importantly for our purposes, this paradigm generates 
broader insights about the preferences and pressures of African 
Americans, which might be missed if we were to assess market 
power more directly—for instance, by going straight to 
anticompetitive effects.175 
This Section begins by discussing the application of the 
market definition/market share paradigm to the retail of wigs 
and hair extensions to African Americans. The it moves onto other 
conceptualizations of market power. It concludes with an 
examination into how antitrust doctrine would have to be 
expanded for African American competitors and consumers to 
bring suit against Korean American producers. 
 
172 HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at § 3.1. 
173 At its core, market power gauges the difference between position of the 
accused firm and a competitive counterfactual. Daniel A. Crane, Market Power 
Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 37 (2014). 
174 See, e.g., See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
437, 440 (2010). 
175 This is especially the case for dynamic industries. See Shelanski, Information, 
Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1673–74 
(2013). 
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A.  Oblique Measures of Market Power 
1.  Market definition 
 
For wigs and hair extensions, market definition is not 
difficult, but the exercise can be enlightening.176 Despite our 
preliminary focus on the products themselves (e.g., wigs), the 
complaints of monopoly and monopolization emanate from the 
retail market, where the interaction between consumers and 
producers happens to be most ethnically misaligned. In the retail 
of wigs and hair extensions to African Americans, which occurs 
mostly in brick and mortar stores, commerce is dominated by 
Korean American-owned shops.177 Consumer–producer frictions 
coincide with—and are therefore augmented by—interracial 
tensions. 
The product market clearly encompasses brick and mortar 
stores, where African American women typically procure wigs 
and extensions. Stores provide convenient access to myriad 
products; consumers can easily compare prices, textures, and 
colors, especially for last-minute purchases prior to a trip to the 
salon. Demand, especially in the form of traditional storefronts, is 
inelastic—one of the two common features of a precisely defined 
market (the other feature being supply inelasticity).178 
Demand for wigs and extensions is inelastic due to social 
preferences that are often infused into law. In the U.S., long, 
straight hair is favored over other styles, a predisposition that 
 
176 Wigs and extensions are also lumped together in BLACK HAIR, supra note 
107, at frame 0:28 (“Even though African Americans make up only 10% of the 
American population, they buy 70% of all wigs and extensions . . .”). 
177 See Lloneau, supra note 16; Sapong, supra note 107; MadameNoire, supra note  
141. 
178 HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 93. 
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reflects the markers of whiteness.179 Because blackness is defined 
in opposition to whiteness,180 the natural hair of African 
Americans, who are racialized as Black, has often been viewed as 
undesirable.181 Thus, products from relaxers to hair extensions 
cater to these preferences.182 Of course, social preferences are 
fluid, and natural hair has been celebrated, if episodically.183 
The law has internalized these norms into its systems of 
incentives. In several jurisdictions, employers can fire or demote 
employees for how they wear their hair, with no repercussions.184 
Hair discrimination cannot necessarily be couched as legally 
actionable discrimination under Title VII.185 And the closer one 
gets to the textured appearance of natural hair, the more one 
 
179 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of 
Analysis under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1193 (2010) (“society’s normative ideal 
for women’s hair [is] straight hair, which hangs down as it grows longer—hair 
that is not naturally grown by black women”). 
180 FLOYA ANTHIAS & NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, RACIALIZED BOUNDARIES: RACE, 
NATION, GENDER, COLOUR, AND CLASS AND THE ANTI-RACIST STRUGGLE 1992); 
CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL DIVIDE 
(2016); IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(2d 3d. 2006). 
181 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 160, at 1107 (“In a society where straight, long, 
fine hair (compared to black hair) is viewed not only as the norm but as the 
ideal for women, tightly coiled black hair easily becomes categorized as 
unacceptable, unprofessional, deviant, and too political.”). See also Matt 
Donnelly, Inside ‘America’s Got Talent’: Ousted Judges Had Complained of Toxic 
Culture, VARIETY, Nov. 26, 2019 (actress Gabrielle Union criticized by the 
producers of the show America’s Got Talent for hairstyles that were “too black”). 
182 Roseborough & McMichael, supra note 104, at 105 (“relaxer is a chemical 
compound applied at varying intervals to permanently break hydrogen 
disulfide bonds along the hair shaft and release the tight curl pattern.”). 
183 E.g., 1960s, black is beautiful movement, and arguably today. 
184 See D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (And Other Race-Based 
Characteristics) Got To Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1370–75 (2008) 
(analyzing Eatman v. United Parcel Service, 194 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
and other cases). 
185 Greene, supra note 165. 
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hazards exclusion, termination, or demotion.186 Even where legal 
protections exist, African Americans understand that natural or 
natural-looking hair can hinder professional advancement.187 
Although we are defining our market as the retail of wigs and 
extensions, it is still illuminating to analyze the products sold. 
One theme that emerges from doing so is the socially embedded 
inelasticity of demand for items that produce straight hair. This 
inelasticity spills over to retail and puts consumers at the mercy 
of retailers.188 The second theme is that not all African American 
hair products are fungible. Even though many products have 
been invented to alter the length and texture of African American 
hair,189 these products are not reasonably interchangeable because 
the associated processes are different: relaxers chemically alter the 
texture of hair coils, sometimes at the risk of chemical burns, while 
wigs and extensions are worn over hair to alter the apparent 
length and curl pattern. And interchangeability is the hallmark of 
market definition: all products that are reasonably 
interchangeable, or can substitute for one another, must factor 
into product market definition.190  
Even within wigs and extensions, we can further distinguish 
products on two additional fronts. First, there is a difference 
 
186 In Eatman, African American UPS drivers were told to cover 
“unconventional” hairstyles,  “which included dreadlocks, braids, corn rolls, a 
dew rag, and a ponytail. 194 F. Supp. 2d at 259.  
187 See Donnelly, supra note 162. 
188 The consequences are not merely economic. African Americans have long 
complained of condescending treatment by Korean American shopkeepers, a 
complicated dynamic that is informed partially by the need for products sold 
and the lack of alternative venues. See. . . Of course, counterexaplmes abound. 
See . . . stories of solidarity  
189 See Roseborough & McMichael, supra note 104, at 104–06; Onwuachi-Willig, 
supra note 162, at 1089. 
190 See U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 400, 404 (1956); 
Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). This is the concept of cross-
elasticity: where substitutes are many, cross-elasticity is high. Yet 
interchangeability and cross-elasticity are prone to error. See Kaplow, supra 
note 156, at 482–91 (explaining why elasticity should be emphasized over cross-
elasticity). 
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between products that replicate tighter curls versus products that 
mimic straight hair. Wigs and extensions might perform similar 
functions, more textured hairpieces might not be good substitutes 
for straight hairpieces. Second, there is a difference between wigs 
and extensions made from human hair and those made from 
synthetic materials. The former is much higher quality and more 
expensive than the latter; and even within human hair, there are 
gradations.191 For our purposes, we focus on human hair, which 
entails a different supply chain than synthetic hair. Again, we note 
that wigs and hair extensions are not the same as the venue in 
which they are sold—here, we focus primarily on the latter. 
As for supply elasticity, assessment comes with 
complications as well. After displacing door-to-door salespeople, 
storefronts enjoyed a decades-long lock on the retail market. 
Offering immediate access to a variety and large quantities of 
products, traditional stores seem to have even fended off 
challenges from newer outlets such as Internet sales and salon-
driven sales.192 Our market should be defined as all retailers to 
encompass these newer outlets; even so, with brick and mortar 
stores predominating, the daylight is slim between all retailers 
and physical stores. 
Nonetheless, supplier elasticity is difficult to pin down 
because there is a glut of firms in any geographic market for 
consumers to choose from—those firms just happen to be mostly 
owned and operated by Korean Americans. In the retail of wigs 
and hair extensions to African Americans, competition is intense. 
It was intraethnic competition, after all, that helped drive the 
industry toward decline in the 1970s.193 Yet despite the abundance 
of retailers, there are very few non-Korean alternatives. Can it be 
said, then, that this market is characterized by supplier inelasticity 
if we consider only the number of firms? Whatever the 
 
191 For example, Remy hair, where cuticles are intact and going in the same 
direction, is considered to be higher end. 
192 See infra notes 187 and 188 and accompanying discussion. 
193 YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13. 
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conclusion, the picture of a supply network that competes 
intensely within itself but cooperates to exclude competition from 
out-group insurgents. 
To be sure, challengers have managed to break through. 
Instead of procuring wigs and extensions from Korean 
wholesalers, however, they rely on nontraditional sourcing. 
Mayvenn, a Black-owned retailer that started in 2012 and is 
funded by Serena Williams and venture capital powerhouse 
Andreessen Horowitz,  sources hair from China and sells either 
directly to consumers or through salons.194 Indique, co-founded 
in 2007 by African American and Indian American partners, 
sources from India, where hair is donated as part of religious 
ceremonies, and sells products through its proprietary salons.195 
The extent of consumer preference for these upstarts is difficult to 
quantify, these alternatives do not command a substantial share 
of the product market yet.196  
As a harbinger of imminent troubles, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection recently seized 13 tons of shipments of human 
hair imports from China.197 The hair was alleged to have been 
shorn from Uighur internees at concentration camps in Xinjiang, 
 
194 Susan Adams, Long on Hair: The World’s First Venture-Backed Human-Hair-
Extension Company Wants To Be The Airbnb of Salons, FORBES, Sept. 27, 2019; 
About Us, MAYVENN, https://shop.mayvenn.com/about-us (last accessed July 
30, 2020). 
195 See Our Company, INDIQUE HAIR EXTENSIONS, 
https://www.indiquehair.com/pages/our-company (last accessed July 30, 
2020). 
196 Mayvenn has been valued at $100 million, while the entire hair extensions 
market is valued at $6 billion. See Adams, supra note 176. Its valuation does not 
necessarily reflect its current share of the market, only its potential. Of course, 
much more in-depth empirical work must be done to break out exactly how 
much of that $6 billion figure pertains to African American consumers and 
what share Mayvenn and traditional retailers control of that sector. 
197 Withhold Release Orders and Findings, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/forced-
labor/withhold-release-orders-and-findings (search under “China” and 
entries 33 and 34 for “Hair Products”).  
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western China, for Muslim minorities.198 Muslim internment is 
one of the worst ongoing violations of human rights in the 
world;199 any supply chain entangled, or even alleged to 
implicate, the labor or body parts of internees could stain an entire 
industry.200 At the very least, if Chinese hair continues to generate 
controversy, then it will prove to be an unstable source for 
insurgent retailers such as Mayvenn.  
 
2.  Market share calculation 
 
With the above considerations in mind, let us define the 
market as the brick-and-mortar retail of wigs and extensions 
made from human hair for consumption by African Americans. 
From here, market share calculation can reveal with greater 
precision the extent of dominance by Korean American suppliers. 
By most accounts, Korean American businesses control 
approximately 70–85 percent of the “ethnic beauty products” 
market.201 Vastly more research must be done to measure the 
market share of Korean American businesses in the relevant 
markets. However, the anecdotal evidence from African 
American consumers is that purchasing wigs and hair extensions 
invariably requires navigating Korean-owned stores.202 
Even if “saturation” of the relevant markets by Korean 
American businesses is assumed, market share analysis will 
 
198 See Martha Mendoza, U.S. Customs Seizes 13-Ton Shipment of Human Hair 
Weaves, Believed to Have Been Cut From Prisoners in Chinese Internment Camps, 
TIME, July 1, 2020; Shalway Evans, That Hair You Just Bought Could Be From an 
Internment Camp in China, ESSENCE, July 2, 2020. 
199 See Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang; 
Marlise Simons Uighur Exiles Push for Court Case Accusing China of Genocide, N.Y. 
Times, July 6, 2020. 
200 See Mendoza. 
201 See, e.g., Sapong, supra note 107 (70%); Lee, supra note 73 (80%); Lloneau, 
supra note 16 (85%). 
202 See, e.g., BLACK HAIR, supra note 107. 
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almost certainly fail traditional measures of concentration 
because numerous small firms play in our ESM market. 
Customarily, market dominance is attributed to one very large 
producer (a monopoly) or a small number of fairly large 
producers (say, an oligopoly of four or five producers).203 Yet 
because producers are small and compete intensely, this feature 
belies our typical understanding of concentration.  
Very few detailed studies have been conducted on the 
numbers of ethnic beauty stores (where wigs and extensions are 
sold) in a geographic market. One study by the sociologist 
Jennifer Lee, who relied on interviews with Korean proprietors, 
pegged the number of ethnic beauty supply stores in New York 
City at 300, with 80 percent of them “Korean owned.”204 Professor 
Lee’s interviews took place in three largely African American 
neighborhoods in New York: East Harlem, West Harlem, and 
Jamaica, Queens.205 While she does not specify the numbers of 
stores in each neighborhood, we can take Jamaica as an example 
and assume  that (1) it comprises a relevant geographic market 
and (2) it has 20 such stores.206 Further, if we assume that the 
intense competition among Korean American retailers yields a 
 
203 Of course, the power of numerous small producers can be augmented if they 
band together—say, through a trade association. In American Colum & Lumber 
Co., for example, the American Hardwood Manufacturers’ Association was 
comprised of approximately 400 members, with 365 of them engaged in the 
information exchange plan. 257 U.S. 377, 391 (1921). In National Society of 
Professional Engineers, the society’s worldwide membership was 69,000, and 
consulting engineers, who were at the heart of the no-bid rule, numbered 
12,000. 435 U.S. 679, 682 (1978).  
204 Lee, supra note 73. 
205 Id. 
206 The African American population in Queens is 148,800 (62% of 240,000 
residents). https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/jamaica-hollis. 
This comprises approximately 7.5% of New York’s 1.992 million African 
Americans. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork. If we 
take Professor Lee’s figures to be accurate, 7.5% of 300 is 22.5 ethnic beauty 
stores for our geographic market. Indeed, a quick Google maps search of 
“ethnic beauty supply Jamaica Queens” returns 22 results. 
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market where no single supplier runs away with market share, 
then our shares might look something like this: 
 
Firm Market Share (%) Firm Market Share (%) 
1 13 11 4 
2 12 12 4 
3 8 13 3 
4 7 14 3 
5 6 15 3 
6 6 16 3 
7 5 17 2 
8 5 18 2 
9 5 19 2 
10 5 20 2 
Table 1. Hypothetical Market Shares in a Relevant Geographic 
Market 
 
We can start with the k-firm concentration ratio, setting k at 4 
to get the commonly utilized four-firm concentration ratio, or the 
sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in the market. 
Here the four-firm ratio would be 40.207 A more precise measure 
is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (“HHI”), or the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of all firms. Under the above 
hypothetical, the HHI would be 682, which does not even cross 
the threshold of moderate concentration.208  
If all but three of firms (assume, e.g., Firms 7–10) were owned 
by Korean Americans, then the Korean-owned firms would 
 
207 See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Concentration Ratios, in NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1987); Dep’t of Justice, Merger Guidelines 
(1968). 
208 U.S. Department of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.3 
(2010). The HHI is the more commonly used index of concentration today, but 
both measures have their flaws. HHI captures the differences in firm size more 
accurately but errs on overestimating the importance of that difference, while 
the four-firm concentration ratio overlooks and undervalues firm size 
disparity. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at § 12.4a2. 
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occupy 80% of the market, but concentration is typically not 
measured in this way.209 Instead, concentration is assessed at the 
level of individual firms. 
While the above illustration is purely conjecture, it 
incorporates an important insight from the literature on Korean 
American small businesses: that they crowd into specific niches 
and compete intensely against one another.210 The success of one 
enterprise prompts others to start a competing enterprise, often in 
close proximity to the first.211  
 
B.  Retailer Diversity 
 
Our defined market would likely not qualify as concentrated 
under the market definition/market share paradigm. However, 
there are other measures of market power whose application to 
antitrust maybe be more appropriate, if experimental. As a salient 
example, economists have proposed looking at the way ecologists 
measures biological diversity, by assessing the richness and 
evenness of a geographical habitat, where richness “is the number 
of different kinds of organisms or species” and evenness 
“compares the similarity of the population size of each of the 
species.”212 Applying these measures to the market for wigs and 
hair extensions, we would find that richness is negligible, and 
evenness skews toward a lopsided quantity of Korean American 
firms. This result is equivalent in ecology to a habitat dominated 
by one species.213  
 
209 Note that Black Owned Hair Care Challenge only has one African American 
retailer listed for Queens. See https://18530fa3-d2e0-49d5-a67b-
522187070841.filesusr.com/ugd/182cb9_81b90ee249eb43f288e60510c6938688.
pdf. 
210 See YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13. 
211 Id. 
212 Paolo M. Adajar et al., The Surprising Hybrid Pedigree of Measures of Diversity 
and Economic Concentration 11, Working Paper 26512 (2019), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26512.  
213 Id. 
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Biologists and ecologists quantify richness and evenness 
through the Simpson’s Diversity Index, which expresses the 
probability “that two organisms chosen at random and 
independently from the population will be found to belong to the 
same species.”214 The Index shifts the analysis from the level of 
individual organisms to the level of species. Incidentally, HHI 
incorporates aspects of richness and evenness as well; for 
instance, squaring firm market shares augments the effect of (and 
therefore accounts for) disparities in firm size. Still, the Simpson’s 
Diversity Index gives us license to think of a market in terms of its 
producer diversity, providing the theoretical basis to look beyond 
individual firms and at the level of ethnic groups. 
The Simpson’s Diversity Index has not been adapted to 
antitrust contexts,215 though diversity has featured prominently 
in some antitrust-adjacent areas of law. Telecommunications law, 
for instance, has grappled with viewpoint diversity in the midst 
of media consolidation,216 with the Federal Communications 
Commission once proposing a diversity index based on the HHI 
to identify media markets where cross-ownership limits should 
be retained.217 Antitrust scholars have also suggested alternatives 
to the narrow focus on price and efficiency, upholding diversity 
in markets where rivals compete on nonprice differentiation.218 In 
close cases such as ours, where traditional market power 
 
214 Id. at 12. See also Edward H. Simpson, The Measurement of Diversity,  163 
NATURE 688 (1949). 
215 But see Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton & Jacob Nussim, Regulation of Book Markets, 
97 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 895 n.425 (2020). 
216 See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media 
Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781 (2009). 
217 See Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 
13620, 13775 (2003). After legal challenges, the index was dropped See 
Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004). 
218 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach 
to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007). Relatedly, on the use of 
competition law to advance small and medium-sized businesses, particularly 
in countries where an ethnic minority controls commerce, see Fox, supra note 
43. 
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paradigms yield ambivalent results, diversity might call for 
antitrust intervention. 
The wig and extensions market is an apt setting to test the 
viability of principles such as diversity and consumer choice. 
Retailers compete intensely, eroding margins and pushing prices 
toward convergence.219  The products themselves are fairly 
homogenous, varying only in texture, length, and curl pattern. 
What distinguishes retailers from one another, then, is 
convenience, selection, and, perhaps most importantly, the ethnic 
identities of each firm’s managers and owners. These three 
factors—convenience, selection, and identity—are important to 
consumers and balance one another in nuanced ways. Yet only 
the ethnic identities of retailers are meaningful to market power. 
From that standpoint, the prevalence of Korean American-owned 
firms makes this market extremely concentrated, with this group 
wielding market power. 
There are reservations, though, with this conceptualization of 
diversity, which pits Korean American retailers against African 
American competitors and consumers. Racial and ethnic 
formation is a dynamic, contested process,220 but this strain of 
market power analysis reduces Korean Americans to one 
homogenous block and African Americans to another, 
extrapolating the degree of diversity from their ratio. In reality, so 
many factors influence racial and ethnic formation that it is 
understood to be ever fluid.221 Racial order is transient and should 
be historically situated.222 To the extent that race signifies “social 
conflicts and interests” embedded in human bodies,223 its 
meaning constantly shifts as those conflicts and interests reorient 
themselves. 
 
219 YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13. 
220 NADIA Y. KIM, IMPERIAL CITIZENS: KOREANS AND RACE FROM SEOUL TO LA xiv 
(2008). 
221 Omi and Winant break race into three critical factors: ethnicity, class, and 
nation. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 22, at 11–13. 
222 OMI & WINANT, supra note 22, at 61. 
223 Id. at 55. 
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Among Korean American shopkeepers, whom we presume 
to constitute a uniform block for the purpose of assessing market 
power, there are notable differences. Many did not stand with 
Soon Ja Du, who fatally shot Latasha Harlins in 1992.224 Then, as 
today, Korean Americans have worked with African Americans 
to build up their communities in pan-racial solidarity.225 More 
pointedly, Korean American retailers may be pursuing divergent 
sourcing strategies. The re-entry of China as a global hair 
supplier,226 coupled with Internet platforms such as Alibaba, 
allows Korean American retailers to bypass co-ethnic wholesalers 
just as much as it allows African American competitors an 
alternative source of products.  
The above factors complicate the picture of Korean American 
solidarity, either as an ethnic unit or as a production unit. 
Ultimately, then, any metric of market power that aggregates the 
multitudes of discrete retailers, even if to assess market diversity, 
does so at the expense of intraethnic nuance. 
 
C.  Anticompetitive Effects 
 
Finally, to avoid the pitfalls of market diversity and market 
definition/market share, we can attempt to detect market power 
through direct evidence of anticompetitive effects.227 
 
224 KIM, supra note 213 (L.A. Korean community asserting Du was “mentally 
unbalanced”). The community also blamed mainstream American media for 
inflaming violence, by relentlessly airing footage of the shooting, glossing over 
White mistreatment of both Korean Americans and African Americans. Id. at 
73. 
225 Of course, episodes such as Los Angeles 1992 can reinforce ethnic cohesion. 
Kim, supra note 83. 
226 I say “re-entry” because in the 1960s, China was a significant supplier until 
the U.S. banned the import of Chinese hair products. BLACK HAIR, supra note 
106. 
227 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (direct 
evidence of Microsoft’s monopoly power). 
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Unfortunately, there is as much disagreement over what 
constitutes direct evidence as there is over market definition.228  
One long-established form of direct evidence is exclusionary 
conduct; for courts have inferred market power from the power 
to exclude competition.229 In our case, this requires looking to the 
upstream market of wig and extensions wholesale and 
distribution, which is a necessary input into the retail of these 
products. An exclusionary strategy might proceed as follows: a 
consortium of wig and extensions wholesalers and distributors, 
all Korean American firms, refuses to sell products to non-
Koreans. The consortium might explicitly refuse to deal with any 
non-Korean retailers, or it might conspire with South Korean wig 
manufacturers to export only to the consortium, rather than 
selling directly to any retailer based in the U.S. This was the very 
strategy of the Korean Hair Goods Association of America, Inc. 
(the “Association”) when DOJ brought suit in 1975. The 
Association collaborated with the association of South Korean wig 
manufacturers and exporters (“KEA”) to restrict the flow of wigs 
to its competitors in the U.S. by, among other strategies, 
mandating that import and distribution flow through the 
Association rather than directly to retailers.230 Because most wigs 
were manufactured in Korea at the time,231 this maneuver choked 
off the supply line for out-group competitors. KEA and the 
Association both enjoyed market power in their respective 
markets—the manufacture and export of wigs in South Korea and 
the important and distribution of wigs into the U.S. 
 
228 See Crane, supra note 166, at 45 (summarizing seven mechanisms of direct 
evidence from lower court decisions). 
229 See id. at 45 n.82 (citing Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 
219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006); Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 
485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004); PepsiCo., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 107 (2d 
Cir. 2002); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 n.2 (6th Cir. 
2002); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
230 See DOJ Consent Decree, 40 Fed. Reg. 
231 Id. at 57698. 
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To a large extent, claims of exclusion have not abated today. 
African American retailers routinely complain that Korean 
wholesalers refuse to deal with them, thereby shutting them out 
of hair products to resell.232 However, exclusion as an indicator of 
market power is difficult to square, both doctrinally and within 
the wig and extensions market specifically.  
While some courts have endorsed the inference of market 
power from exclusionary conduct,233 this inference is beset by 
circularity because recovery for exclusion is permitted only if the 
alleged excluder possesses market power.234 One widely 
recognized exception to this circularity is where the excluders are 
able to raise their rivals’ costs.235 Examples abound of such 
exclusionary schemes—for example, the foreclosure or denial of 
access of to a necessary input by incumbents signals their market 
power.236 In the wig and extensions market, the clearest instance 
of this type of exclusion would be any concerted effort among 
Korean manufacturers, wholesalers, or distributors to deny 
African American retailers access to hair products. If that 
transpires, then the insurgents would have to find new sources of 
 
232 BLACK HAIR, supra note 107. 
233 See, e.g., Brooke Groupe Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209 (1993).  
234 Crane, supra note 166, at 64–65. 
235 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) 
236 This is the crux of the essential facilities claim, which is established if: (1) a 
monopolist controls a facility that (2) a competitor is unable to practically or 
reasonably duplicate and (3) use of the facility is denied to the claimant, even 
though (4) it is feasible for the monopolist to provide access. MCI Commc’ns 
Corp. v. Am. Tel & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). For its case 
law lineage, see Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 
U.S. 398, 415 (2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585, 611 (1985), Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 
(1973), and United States v. Terminal R.R Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411-
13 (1912). For examples, see, e.g., [prior work redacted for anonymity]. For 
theoretical support, see Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2147, 2155 (Mark Armstrong & 
Robert H. Porter eds., 2007). 
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raw materials (e.g., hair from India) and possibly manufacture the 
hair products themselves.237 Or insurgents would have to source 
manufactured products from someplace other than South 
Korea.238 
Proving exclusionary conduct by Korean American 
importers, wholesalers, and distributors is not difficult. There 
appear to be only a few such firms (as opposed to nearly 10,000 
retailers), which more easily facilitates coordination; collectively, 
these firms wield market power.239 It is an altogether different 
matter, however, to prove that this exclusion raises the costs of 
African American retailers. The rise of China as a source of wigs 
and extensions may be drastically cutting suppliers’ costs. 
Relatedly, the fact that hair in India is donated means that raw 
material costs might be even lower if South Korea is bypassed. 
More work must be done to figure out the margins of sourcing 
from South Korea versus China and India. For now, the fact that 
some African American competitors are thriving—and two are 
outright thriving—amidst the exclusion undercuts any argument 
of Korean market power. 
Exclusion is commonly a consequence of vertical integration. 
Wholesalers and resellers, or an upstream facility and a 
downstream monopolist, must be unified to some degree for them 
to foreclose markets or raise rivals’ costs. To be sure, ethnic bonds 
go a long way toward fostering commercial cohesion,240 but the 
vertical integration of Korean wholesalers and Korean American 
retailers is not frictionless. Although outsiders cannot easily peer 
into these relations, we can glean some insights from the public 
record of litigation. The handful of cases implicating Korean 
American wig and extensions retailers reveals that manufacturers 
and wholesalers can be extremely demanding of retailers, 
pressing them to agree to quotas of regular shipments, backed by 
 
237 This appears to be the Indique model. See Our Company, supra note 188. 
238 This appears to be the Mayvenn model. See Adams, supra note 176. 
239 See BLACK HAIR, supra note 107. 
240 Wilson & Martin, supra note 77. 
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personal guarantees.241 More generally, these cases show that 
ethnic beauty supplies is a rough-and-tumble industry, where 
business partners can turn on one another.242 Co-ethnic bonds 
must therefore not be presumed. 
Of course, this may also be an industry where in-group 
incumbents compete intensely against one another but are willing 
to band together to stymie out-group insurgents. This is the model 
from other markets such as finance.243 Yet those markets are 
typically dominated by a small oligopoly of large producers. 
Here, we are dealing with a large and diverse world of small 
retailers. 
Nonetheless, if Korean American firms are analyzed as a 
cohesive unit, then their staying power would push antitrust 
toward finding an offense and devising a remedy—either for 
express coordination or, more experimentally, parallel exclusion. 
If competitors or consumers can produce evidence of express 
coordination, then this market would show that collusive and 
exclusionary scheme may be more stable than antitrust theory 
holds.244 This determination may depend on the intuition from  
sociology that an ethnic group withdraws into itself, 
strengthening co-ethnic bonds, when threatened by exogenous 
forces.245 Here the external threats would be competition and 
interracial tensions. Alternatively, at the wholesale level, Korean 
American firms may well be determining independently (rather 
than working together) to deny out-group rivals access to a 
necessary input. Even still, antitrust doctrine around 
noncooperative oligopolies may regard this as a form of parallel 
exclusion that militates toward intervention.246  
 
241 Daweoo Int’l (America) Corp. v. Chade Int’l, Inc., 1992 WL 175600. 
242 See T3Micro, Inc. v. SGI Co., Ltd., 2010 WL 11597603. 
243 See [prior work redacted for anonymity]. 
244 See, e.g., Selten, supra note 19; Levenstein & Suslow, , supra note 19; Dick, , 
supra note 19. 
245 See Turner & Bonacich, supra note 21. 
246 See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1237–
38 (2013). 
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Ultimately, market power is an attempt to express the delta, 
or difference, between the market at hand and a perfectly 
competitive counterfactual.247 This bears out in the various 
mathematical expressions of market power.248 With the advent of 
China and India as suppliers of hair and wigs, as well as platforms 
to connect retailers and even consumers with non-Korean 
suppliers, that delta may be diminishing. More empirical work on 
price and marginal cost must be done, of course, but this market 
may be converging toward perfect competition more swiftly than 
ever before. 
 
D.  Facilitating Practices 
 
A finding of market power does not end the inquiry. African 
American challengers would have to couch their claims in 
conformity with antitrust doctrine, which presently does not offer 
many viable avenues. 
One possible claim is that the actions of Korean American 
wholesalers and retailers, from the refusal to carry African 
American-made products to the refusal to extend African 
American retailers credit, amount to a group boycott of—or a 
horizontal agreement to refuse to deal with—African American 
competitors. At its inception, courts had subjected group boycotts 
 
247 Crane, supra note 166, at 33 (“[M]arket power only makes sense as an 
expression, in relative terms, of the distance between the market as it is and a 
competitive counterfactual . . . Since antitrust policy aims to reduce the delta 
between a plausible competitive counterfactual and the actual circumstances, 
market power should be understood as that delta--the infirmity that antitrust 
law could correct.”). 
248 E.g., the Lerner index: L = (P – MC)/P, where P denotes price and MC 
marginal cost. Here the delta is between price and marginal cost. In other 
words, in a perfectly competitive world, price would equal marginal cost, so 
the excess of price over marginal cost reveals a firm’s market power. 
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to per se illegality, the highest level of scrutiny in antitrust.249 Yet, 
as elsewhere in antitrust, condemnation of these schemes has 
softened in recent years, particularly where procompetitive 
justifications lurk.250 This swing has been so extreme that the 
presumption on group boycotts is now validity under a rule of 
reason approach, rather than illegality under a per se approach.251  
As a vertical strategy, refusal to deal in facilitation of 
exclusion is accorded even greater deference. Refusal to deal is 
often brought as an essential facilities claim against a defendant 
who controls a necessary input (typically, an infrastructure with 
network effects) into a market.252 Customarily, the defendant is a 
monopolist, or at least an oligopoly whose market power is 
indisputable.253 Yet even if African American challengers were to 
establish that Korean American retailers harbored market power, 
essential facilities has been eviscerated as a theory of harm.254 The 
high-water mark of the duty to deal doctrine has long passed,255 
and today’s courts simply view a refusal to deal as the province 
of businesses. 
Procompetitive efficiencies also justify information sharing, a 
strategy among competitors that can be challenged as a 
 
249 See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. U.S., 234 U.S. 600, 
614 (1914); American Medical Ass’n v. U.S., 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Klors v. 
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). 
250 See, e.g., NYMEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 134 (1998). For analysis 
on this doctrine’s application to an ethnically segmented market similar to the 
one at hand, see Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: 
Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 340–46 
(2009). 
251 HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 239. 
252 See supra note 236. 
253 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973); 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 
(2004). 
254 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410–11 (“We have never recognized [the essential 
facilities doctrine], and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it 
here.”) (citations omitted). 
255 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
611 (1985); Otter Tail, 410 U.S. 
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facilitation device for collusion and exclusion even in the absence 
of express agreement. Claimants might allege, for example, that 
the publication of product catalogs and trade journals in the 
Korean language operates to signal inventory pricing while 
shutting out non-Korean retailers. In their defense, the 
incumbents might point to the dominance of South Korean 
manufacturers and exporters as suppliers, with whom U.S. 
distributers and retailers can communicate more easily in Korean. 
The likelihood of success of these claims is difficult to quantify. 
On one hand, the wigs and extensions market is characterized by 
fungible products and inelastic demand,256 and these information 
exchanges might pertain to price257 or further a group boycott.258 
On the other hand, however, information exchanges are more 
suspect in concentrated markets,259 and African American 
insurgents must be able to point to some sort of actual exchange 
of information, ideally within the incriminating areas.260 This 
claim seems to turn, again, on market power, which itself turns on 
the appropriateness of analysis at the firm versus ethnic group 
level. 
Efficiencies do abound in the wig and extensions market. The 
degree of vertical integration among co-ethnic manufacturers, 
distributors, and retailers means that products can be moved 
quickly to any locality in the U.S. Korean American retailers in 
African American communities can also spot new trends and 
transmit this information to South Korean manufacturers, who 
can respond rapidly. Simultaneously, the rough-and-tumble 
 
256 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 236 (information exchange certain to be 
condemned if the market is concentrated, the price is fungible, and demand is 
inelastic). 
257 See id. at 237 (price information exchanges suspicious). See also American 
Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377 (1921); U.S. v. American Linseed 
Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923). 
258 See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 
(1914). 
259 See supra note 256. 
260 For a similar discussion, see Richman, supra note 250, at 352–55. 
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competition among retailers means that prices should converge 
toward competitive, rather than supracompetitive, levels. 
The central question this ESM market is therefore who is 
harmed: Who is harmed by the actions of Korean American firms 
in this market—African American consumers or competitors? If 
prices are competitive, the answer would not be consumers. 
Indeed, group boycotts, refusals to deal, and information 
exchanges are injurious only to competitors, with offsetting 
efficiencies for consumers. The very use of “ethnic misalignment” 
for this market suggests that it is competitors who are harmed 
because they are denied the chance to sell to co-ethnic 
consumers.261  
To work through the implications, we might imagine a 
market in which an African American insurgent were to break 
through and eventually run away with market share—say, if 
Mayvenn or Indique were to displace the vast majority of Korean 
American retailers. In such a market, with a monopoly firmly in 
control, prices would trend toward supracompetitive levels. 
Which, then, would African American consumers prefer? The 
ethnically misaligned market where thousands of out-group 
producers compete against one another but shut out in-group 
competitors, or the ethnically aligned market dominated by one 
producer with clear market power? 
The answer is unclear. While pertinent to the wig and 
extensions market, this question also underscores the 
ambivalence of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; for 
this market is characterized by intense intra-producer 
competition, yet consumers are unsatisfied by their choices. 
As for the more basic questions of whether Korean American 
firms bear market power and whether antitrust would condemn 
their business practices, the results are indeterminate. In the face 
of such indeterminacy, it would seem unwise to concoct new 
theories on market power or facilitating practices. However, 
inaction means that antitrust doctrine will have come down in 
 
261 Thanks to Harry First for pointing this out. 
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favor of one ethnic group. Such is the quandary at the heart of an 
ESM market where both producers and consumers are peoples of 
color. Err for producers, and antitrust will have endorsed a 
community of mostly immigrant entrepreneurs who have opted 
out of the mainstream U.S. economy because of racial barriers. Err 
for consumers, and antitrust will have upheld a racial group that 
has been denied participation in the sale of a product that is 
central to their identity. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The stakes are high for getting ESM markets right. In the U.S., 
interactions between peoples of color often unfold as commercial 
transactions in markets where groups are pushed into close 
quarters, hemmed in on all sides by structural racism and 
systemic exclusion. When, as in the wig and extensions market, 
those markets are ethnically misaligned, intergroup tensions can 
be inflamed. Such tensions exploded in 1992 with racial unrest in 
Los Angeles, but it was not an anomaly. Korean American-owned 
wig stores have been destroyed during protests in Ferguson, 
Missouri, in 2014 after prosecutors failed to Michael Brown’s 
killer and also in Baltimore in 2015 after the funeral of Freddie 
Gray.262 
As the very first step, a proper understanding of ESM markets 
is critical. This Article has synthesized the disparate literature on 
ethnically segmented markets to create the theoretical foundation 
for ESM markets. In using the wig and extensions market as an 
illustration, the Article reveals how ESM markets challenge 
traditional notions of market power and oligopoly stability. 
Hence, ESM markets and antitrust doctrine are mutually 
illuminating. 
More empirical work must be completed before we can 
determine whether antitrust law conveys any recourse to African 
American retailers and consumers in the wig and extensions 
 
262 Petrulis, supra note 15, at 30. 
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market. However, for the first time in decades, this market is 
changing quickly from new sourcing strategies that have 
bolstered the hand of African American competitors. The old 
guard of Korean American retailers is also aging out, and their 
children may eschew this hardscrabble business, with its intense 
competition, diminishing margins, and interracial tensions. Given 
the dynamic process of racial and ethnic formation, these children 
may not even feel the same fidelity toward co-ethnic bonds. Thus, 
by the time antitrust has devised a solution, this market may have 
outgrown the need for redress. 
